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1	 A	catch-all	party	
(Volkspartei)	is	
a	party	that	repre-
sents	a	wide	range	
of	views	and	is	split	
into	factions	that	re-
present	these	views,	
with	numerous	
members	and	
a	broad	electoral	
base	made	up	
of	people	from	diffe-
rent	social	groups.
2	 The	exception	to	this	
rule	is	the	participa-
tion	of	the	Left	Party	
in	ruling	coalitions	
in	Berlin	(in	2002,	
as	PDS	at	the	time	–	
since	2007	PDS	has	
been	part	of	the	Left	
Party)	and	Branden-
burg	(2009).
Ordnung muss nicht sein 
Developments on the German political scene
Marta Zawilska-Florczuk
The results of parliamentary elections in seven German federal states, on-
going since early 2011, show the collapse of the existing order on the 
German political scene, both on a national level and on the level of the 
individual federal states. So far, the federal states have been governed by 
one of the catch-all parties1 – i.e. the Christian Democrats or Social De-
mocrats – in coalitions with smaller partners – the FDP and the Greens, 
respectively2. This year’s elections have fully revealed the extent of social 
transformation in Germany and its impact on voting preferences and the 
hitherto stable party system in this country. The largest and most popular 
parties so far – the CDU and the SPD – are losing the voters’ confidence 
and support, whereas the parties associated with protest movements (such 
as the Greens) are gaining prominence. Moreover, the German political 
scene is undergoing increasing fragmentation, as new small, local groups 
are appearing who have no political aspirations at the federal level but 
who are attractive to voters acting as successful groups of common cause. 
The changes in the existing balance of power on the German political scene 
are being sped up by the specific features of the federal system. Elections 
to the parliaments of the federal states are held at regular intervals which 
increasingly affects policies on the national level. The key decisions that 
concern domestic and foreign affairs are made under the pressure of con-
stant election campaigns. 
The changes in German society
Over	the	last	20	years,	German	society	has	undergone	a	profound	transformation	that	has	
affected	people’s	voting	preferences	and	 their	approach	 to	politics.	This	 transformation	
results	from	demographic	changes,	an	increasing	individualisation	of	German	citizens	and	
a	growing	diversity	of	groups	comprising	the	middle	class.
The	structure	and	standpoints	of	German	society	have	been	affected	most	by	the	reunifica-
tion	of	the	two	German	states,	as	a	result	of	which	the	country’s	population	increased	by	
18.5	million	citizens	with	a	different	socialisation.	The	wave	of	emigration	of	a	young,	edu-
cated	population	from	the	eastern	to	western	federal	states	has	also	resulted	in	the	mixing	
of	various	social	groups	with	differing	mentalities	and	outlooks.	Germany	also	owes	its	social	
diversity	to	a	growing	number	of	residents	of	 immigrant	origin	(every	fourth	person	living	
in	Germany	is	a	foreigner	or	a	child/grandchild	of	a	foreign	citizen).
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Another	aspect	is	the	aging	of	the	population	of	Germany.	According	to	estimations	made	
by	German	demographers,	the	country’s	population	will	have	shrunk	by	5	million	people	
by	2030.
Demographic	factors	and	processes	that	are	taking	place	in	Germany	and	worldwide	(globa-
lisation,	non-traditional	forms	of	work3	becoming	widespread)	are	affecting	German	society	
and	making	it	increasingly	more	individualistic.	This	leads	to	the	disintegration	of	traditional	
circles	and	common	 interest	groups	that	had	been	around	for	decades,	and	with	whom	
a	 large	part	of	German	society	had	 identified	 (workers,	 the	middle	 class,	 civil	 servants,	
trade	unions	and	others).	The	individualisation	of	Germans	currently	observed	is	reflected	
in	the	behaviour	of	voters	during	the	Bundestag	elections	in	2005	and	2009,	e.g.	in	their	
spontaneous	voting	decisions,	made	to	suit	their	interests	of	the	moment	and	not	resulting	
from	their	established	political	views,	as	had	previously	been	the	case4.	The	proportion	of	
people	who	do	not	participate	in	national-
level	elections	is	also	growing	–	in	2009,	
30%	of	German	 citizens	 did	 not	 partici-
pate	 in	 the	 Bundestag	 elections,	 which	
was	7	percentage	points	(pp)	more	than	
in	2005.	The	situation	is	different	on	the	
federal	 states	 level,	where	election	cam-
paigns	 revolve	 around	 local	 issues	 and	
address	 potential	 voters	 more	 directly.	
The	 turnout	 in	 these	 elections	 is	 higher:	
in	the	elections	to	the	Baden-Württemberg	
parliament	in	March	2011	it	exceeded	66%,	which	was	12	pp	more	than	5	years	ago5.	
This	proves	that	the	political	activity	of	Germans	is	not	fading	but	is	taking	a	new	form.	
Until	recently,	this	activity	was	defined	as	the	participation	in	elections	and	membership	in	
political	parties	and	trade	unions.	At	the	moment,	it	is	more	frequently	manifested	in	pe-
ople’s	social	activity,	their	involvement	in	associations,	participation	in	local	civic	initiatives,	
etc.	What	has	also	become	more	evident,	when	compared	to	previous	years,	is	the	readi-
ness	of	citizens	to	protest	against	the	initiatives	of	local	politicians	which	may	have	a	nega-
tive	impact	on	a	given	community,	chief	among	these,	infrastructural	projects.	This	trend	is	
best	illustrated	by	the	protests	against	the	extension	of	the	railway	station	in	Stuttgart	that	
lasted	several	months;	similar	demonstrations	regularly	take	place	throughout	Germany6.
The	German	middle	class	is	also	changing;	it	now	comprises	about	60-67%	of	society,	and	
is	defined	as	the	group	of	people	whose	households	have	a	combined	income	ranging	from	
70	to	150%	of	an	average	wage.	Before	the	1990s,	affiliation	with	one	of	the	groups	wi-
thin	the	middle	class7	in	practice	equalled	belonging	to	the	core	electorate	of	a	given	party.	
Thus,	blue	collar	workers	would	vote	for	the	SPD,	the	urban	population	for	the	FDP	or	the	
CDU,	while	farmers	would	vote	for	the	CDU	and	the	CSU.	Educated	voters	usually	voted	for	
the	FDP	and	CDU	or	CSU.	Now	the	new	middle	class	is	comprised	of	people	with	higher	
education	who	do	not	occupy	managerial	positions	(such	as	teachers),	freelancers,	white-
collar	workers,	service	providers,	and	qualified	workers8.	Ever	more	often	these	are	morally	
liberal	 and	 socially-sensitive	 individuals,	 concerned	with	protecting	 the	 environment	 and	
supportive	of	the	idea	of	the	welfare	state,	though	at	the	same	time	opposed	to	its	excessive	
expansion	(e.g.	too	high	unemployment	benefits).
	
	
	
3	 A	decreasing	number	of	
employment	contracts	in	favour	
of	temporary	contracts,	speci-
fied-purpose	contracts,	working	
from	home,	working	part-time.	
	
	
	
4	 According	to	the	poll	conducted	
by	the	Infratest	Dimap	institute	
after	the	2009	elections	to	
the	Bundestag,	33%	of	voters	
made	up	their	minds	and	chose	
the	party	they	would	vote	
for	just	a	few	days	before	
the	election.	
	
	
	
	
5	 In	the	elections	to	the	parlia-
ment	of	Rhineland-Palatinate	
on	28	March	2011	the	turnout	
(over	61%)	increased	
by	about	4	pp.
	
	
	
	
	
	
6	 For	example,	the	demonstra-
tion	against	the	extension	of	
Frankfurt	airport	and	protests	
against	the	construction	of	an	
international	airport	in	Berlin	
in	2009.
7	 These	groups	were	defined	ba-
sing	on	their	household	income;	
according	to	this	definition,	
manual	workers	also	belong	
to	the	middle	class	and	one	
of	its	groups	described	below.
8	 Sociologists	from	the	German	
Sinus	Sociovision	institute	
divide	the	contemporary	middle	
class	into	8	groups:	the	Establi-
shed	Conservative	milieu,	
the	Socio-ecological	milieu,	
the	Movers	and	Shakers	milieu,	
the	Adaptive	Pragmatist	milieu,	
the	New	Middle	Class	milieu,	
the	Traditional	milieu,	the	
Escapist	milieu,	and	the	High	
Achiever	milieu.	For	details	see:	
www.sinus-sociovision.de/en
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Demographic factors and processes 
that are taking place in Germany and 
worldwide are making German society 
and more individualistic. This leads to 
the disintegration of circles and inte-
rest groups that had been around for 
decades, and with whom a large part 
of German society had identified.
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The twilight of large parties
The	described	transformation	of	German	society	and	the	 lack	of	any	adequate	response	
thereupon	by	the	largest	parties,	makes	these	parties	–	notably	the	CDU	and	the	SPD	–	lose	
their	members	and	voters	on	a	scale	unprecedented	in	Germany	(see	the	Appendix).	This	
process	has	in	turn	fuelled	internal	conflicts	within	these	parties	concerning	their	program-
me	and	priorities	of	action.	
Back	in	the	1980s,	the	stability	of	the	Ger-
man	political	scene	was	based	on	the	exi-
stence	of	two	catch-all	parties	–	the	CDU	
(along	with	its	sister	party	the	CSU)	and	
the	SPD,	who	jointly	covered	over	80%	of	
all	votes	during	elections.	The	position	of	
these	parties	seemed	so	strong,	and	their	
voter	 base	 so	 solid,	 that	 the	 emergence	
of	 any	 smaller	 political	 parties	 did	 not	
seem	a	threat.	Meanwhile,	since	the	early	
1990s	the	large	parties	have	been	losing	their	support	with	each	subsequent	election,	both	
on	the	national	and	federal	state	level,	even	in	the	regions	where	they	had	been	winning	
about	50%	of	all	the	votes9.	The	experts	have	begun	referring	to	the	twilight	of	catch-all	
parties10.	At	the	moment,	the	voters	who	consistently	vote	for	one	particular	catch-all	party	
comprise	as	little	as	5	to	10%	of	its	electorate.	The	number	of	members	of	these	parties	
has	 also	 noticeably	 decreased,	which	 over	 the	 years	 had	 been	 the	 factor	 defining	 their	
significance	on	the	political	scene	of	Germany;	the	number	of	people	leaving	the	parties	
is	constantly	increasing.	More	than	half	of	the	members	of	the	catch-all	parties	are	over	
60	years	old,	while	the	share	of	members	under	30	years	old	is	around	5%.	For	comparison,	
in	2007	people	under	30	comprised	about	13%	of	all	members	of	 the	Greens11,	and	 it	
can	be	assumed	that	this	share	is	currently	even	higher.	There	are	also	much	fewer	people	
joining	the	catch-all	parties	at	the	moment	than	the	smaller	ones,	first	of	all,	the	Greens	
(in	2010	the	party	numbered	4,500	members	more	than	a	year	earlier).
The	federal	form	of	government	in	Germany	is	also	becoming	an	increasing	challenge	for	
the	 catch-all	 parties.	 The	 influence	 of	 the	 Bundesrat,	 which	 represents	 federal	 states,	
on	 national-level	 politics	 is	 growing.	Whenever	 the	 composition	 of	 federal	 state	 govern-
ments	corresponds	with	the	composition	of	the	national-level	coalition,	the	Bundesrat	only	
endorses	the	decisions	made	by	the	Bundestag.	However,	if	–	as	is	currently	the	case	–	
the	parties	ruling	on	the	national	level	do	not	have	a	majority	in	the	Bundesrat,	pushing	
through	laws	requires	long	negotiations	and	far-reaching	compromises.	The	fear	of	losing	
voters	in	federal	states	makes	the	national-level	ruling	parties	reduce	their	policies	to	short-
term	solutions	and	constant	election	campaigns.	At	the	same	time,	the	key	decisions	in	the	
catch-all	parties	are	made	by	their	top	leaders,	which	runs	counter	to	the	formerly	applied	
principle	of	broad	debates	and	consultations	with	the	greatest	possible	number	of	members.	
As	a	result,	various	decisions	become	incomprehensible	for	the	rank-and-file	members	who	
raise	their	objections12,	while	voters	perceive	these	parties	as	conflict-ridden,	divided	and	
unable	to	reach	a	compromise.	This	creates	a	stalemate	wherein	the	politicians	who	have	
a	vision	of	the	party’s	reform	are	being	silenced	for	fear	that	they	will	scare	off	loyal	voters,	
while	the	outflow	of	the	core	electorate	is	treated	as	an	argument	against	modernisation	of	
the	party’s	programme	and	a	change	of	its	priorities13.
9	 The	SPD	in	North	Rhine-	
-Westphalia	in	2005,	the	CSU	
in	Bavaria	in	2008,	the	CDU	
in	Baden-Württemberg	in	2011.
10	 Compare	e.g.:	Franz	Walter,	
Im	Herbst	der	Volksparteien?,	
Transcript	Verlag,	Bielefeld	
2009;	Franz	Decker,	Viola	Neu,	
Handbuch	der	deutschen	Parte-
ien,	VS	Verlag	für	Sozialwissen-
sachften,	Wiesbaden	2007.
11	More	recent	data	has	not	been	
published	yet.
12	 An	example	of	such	a	decision	
being	made	by	the	CSU	is	the	
party	leader	Horst	Seehofer’s	
radical	change	of	position	on	
nuclear	energy,	which	had	not	
been	consulted	with	the	party.	
Seehofer,	who	had	been	a	dec-
lared	supporter	of	nuclear	ener-
gy,	became	one	of	Germany’s	
first	politicians	to	call	for	giving	
up	on	nuclear	power	plants	and	
replacing	them	with	alternative	
sources	of	energy.	In	the	case	
of	the	SPD,	the	disputed	issue	
was	the	package	of	the	German	
welfare	system	reforms	Agenda	
2010,	presented	by	Gerhard	
Schröder.	The	‘party	base’	was	
not	involved	in	the	debate	over	
the	controversial	reforms	which	
led	to	a	split	in	the	party	
in	2005	and	the	establishment	
of	a	party	called	WASG	
(by	the	SPD’s	former	deputy	
chairman	Oskar	Lafontaine).		
wo	years	later	WASG	merged	
with	the	Left	Party.	
13	 An	example	of	this	is	the	criti-
cism	of	Angela	Merkel	by	the	
conservative	faction	of	the	CDU	
who	accuse	the	Chancellor	of	
neglecting	traditional	Christian	
Democrat	values	(attention	
for	Catholic	circles	and	
for	the	Federation	of	Expellees,	
support	for	traditional	division	
of	social	roles,	etc.).
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The transformation of German society 
and the lack of any adequate respon-
se thereupon by the largest parties, 
makes the CDU and the SPD lose their 
members and voters. This process has 
in turn fuelled internal conflicts within 
these parties concerning their pro-
gramme and priorities of action.
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The middle class as a remedy for the catch-all parties’ troubles?
Facing	a	fall	in	opinion	polls	and	an	outflow	of	members,	the	catch-all	parties	are	seeking	
the	broadest	possible	support	within	the	middle	class.	Since	the	German	middle	class	is	
not	a	homogeneous	group,	 the	parties	 try	 to	convey	a	message	attractive	 to	 the	widest	
audience	possible.
The	contraction	of	the	core	electorate	of	the	large	parties	is	leading	to	a	situation	where	
they	begin	competing	for	a	similar	group	of	voters	–	the	middle	class	and	voters	who	are	
not	permanently	associated	with	any	of	the	political	groups.	In	their	attempts	to	canvass	
the	support	of	the	same	voters,	the	large	parties	abandon	or	significantly	modify	their	tra-
ditional	rhetoric	and	take	over	the	slogans	of	their	political	competitors14.	Despite	program	
differences,	still	present	in	the	party	statutes,	the	parties	are	moving	closer	to	each	other	
on	many	issues,	which	was	best	exemplified	in	2005-2009	by	the	Grand	Coalition	govern-
ment	made	up	of	the	Christian	Democrats	and	Social	Democrats.	This	sort	of	assimilation	
of	the	parties,	on	the	one	hand,	makes	it	easier	to	set	up	a	coalition	outside	their	traditional	
political	camps	(see	e.g.	the	Grand	Coalition,	the	Christian	Democrats’	coalition	with	the	
Greens,	 the	Social	Democrats’	coalition	with	 the	Liberals),	 reducing	 the	 risk	of	potential	
inter-governmental	disputes	concerning	individual	policies.	On	the	other	hand,	coming	too	
close	to	competing	groups	carries	the	risk	of	losing	the	party’s	credibility,	as	it	inevitably	
entails	neglect	of	the	issues	held	as	fundamental,	although	‘sensitive’	for	potential	coalition	
partners.	This	is	causing	discontent	among	the	core	voters,	who	accuse	the	party	of	neglec-
ting	its	programme	basics	that	determine	its	identity.
To	reach	as	many	potential	voters	as	possible,	the	leadership	of	most	of	the	parties	attempt	
to	make	their	message	as	attractive	as	possible.	The	use	of	new	technologies	is	becoming	
widespread	(e.g.	websites	with	multimedia	content,	presence	on	social	networking	sites)15,	
the	 parties	 also	 attach	 great	 importance	
to	media	exposure	and	prompt	 reactions	
to	 events	 and	 the	 public	 mood.	 Greater	
importance	than	ever	is	attached	to	polls	
and	all	sorts	of	party	popularity	rankings	
based	on	poll	results.
However,	 the	efforts	made	by	politicians	
from	the	catch-all	parties	in	the	attempt	to	
acquire	new	voters	from	the	middle	class	
are	often	counterproductive.	The	analysis	of	voters	changing	parties	shows	that	the	large	
parties	(especially	the	CDU)	are	able	to	win	part	of	the	electorate	of	their	rivals,	especially	
those	who	did	not	participate	in	previous	elections16.	However,	it	is	the	small	parties	who	
are	much	more	successful	in	stealing	voters	from	the	catch-all	parties.	Smaller	groups	are	
usually	in	opposition	and	their	programmes	are	rarely	verified	in	real	life,	therefore	they	en-
joy	greater	voter	confidence	than	the	catch-all	parties	who	have	been	in	power	alternately	
in	different	coalitions.	This	applies	primarily	to	the	Greens,	but	also	to	the	Left	Party	which	
gained	part	of	the	CDU	and	even	the	liberal	FDP	electorate	in	the	elections	to	the	Baden-	
-Württemberg	parliament17.
	
	
	
	
	
	
14	 See	e.g.	the	policy	by	Ursula	
von	der	Leyen,	German	mini-
ster	of	family	affairs	
in	the	Grand	Coalition	
government	in	2005-2009,	
who	opted	for	creating	
possibilities	for	women	to	
return	to	work	after	childbirth	
as	quickly	as	possible,	and	
Angela	Merkel’s	environmental	
policy	in	the	first	years	after	
taking	power	in	2005.
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
15	 The	government	spokesman	
regularly	publishes	comments	
on	the	government’s	current	
activity	on	Twitter.
	
	
	
16	 See	e.g.	in	the	elections	to	
the	Baden-Württemberg	par-
liament	in	2011,	the	Christian	
Democrats	won	221,000	
votes	from	people	who	had	
not	participated	in	previous	
elections	and	66,000	votes	
from	former	FDP	voters.
17	 Among	those	who	switched	to	
vote	for	the	Left	Party,	
the	largest	groups	were	CDU	
voters	(5,000	votes)	and	FDP	
voters	(3,000	votes).	
Despite	this,	the	Left	Party	
(due	to	its	traditional	weak-
ness	in	Baden-Württemberg)	
received	only	2.8%	of	votes	
and	remained	outside	
the	federal	state	parliament.
The contraction of the core electo-
rate of the large parties is leading to 
a situation where they begin com-
peting for a similar group of voters – 
the middle class and voters who 
are not permanently associated 
with any of the political groups. 
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18	The	Pirate	Party,	which	has	
existed	in	Germany	since	
2006,	wins	most	of	its	votes	
in	large	university	towns.	It	
is	represented	primarily	in	
local	government	structures	
–	municipalities	and	county	
councils.	According	to	the	
data	from	February	2011,	the	
party	has	15	seats	in	such	
bodies	across	the	country.	
Free	Voters	have	the	strongest	
position	in	southern	federal	
states:	Baden-Württemberg	
and	Bavaria.	In	Baden-Würt-
temberg	they	are	the	strongest	
group	in	the	municipal	coun-
cils	(44%	of	councillors)	and	
second	in	the	county	councils	
(24%	of	councillors).	
19	18%	of	Germans	surveyed	in	
2010	by	the	Emnid	institute	
declared	they	could	vote	for	a	
party	which	would	be	critical	
of	immigrants	who	refuse	to	
assimilate	and	which	would	
opt	for	restricting	immigration	
regulations.	For	comparison,	
22%	of	Germans	declared	
they	would	vote	for	the	SPD	
(survey	of	June	3,	2011).
20	The	Left	Party,	which	was	
originally	considered	a	mar-
ginal	protest	group,	is	now	
represented	in	most	of	the	
federal	state	parliaments,	and	
in	the	eastern	federal	states	it	
is	the	second	most	influential	
political	party	after	the	Chri-
stian	Democrats.
The boom for small parties and grassroots citizens’ movements
The	problems	of	the	catch-all	parties	are	fostering	the	expansion	of	smaller	groups,	which	
take	up	 local	 issues	or	 those	overlooked	by	major	parties.	The	susceptibility	 to	political	
radicalism	of	some	sections	of	society	(especially	among	young	people)	also	works	to	the	
advantage	of	smaller	parties.	The	ones	who	have	gained	most	recently	are	the	parties	loca-
ted	on	the	left	side	of	the	political	scene	–	the	Greens	and	the	Left	Party.
The	crisis	of	the	large	parties	and	the	emergence	of	new	social	expectations	have	brought	
about	the	fragmentation	of	German	political	scene,	not	only	at	the	level	of	federal	states,	
where	this	is	a	well-known	phenomenon,	but	also	at	the	national	level.	The	parties	that	are	
gaining	importance	are	either	the	newly	emerging	ones	or	the	existing	ones	that	had	not	
played	a	significant	role	in	German	politics,	such	as	WASG,	the	Pirate	Party	and	Free	Vo-
ters.	These	parties	focus	on	the	problems	of	local	communities	and	try	to	meet	the	expec-
tations	of	voters,	as	is	the	case	with	Free	Voters	who	opt	for	greater	support	for	families,	
good	access	to	medical	care	and	the	use	of	renewable	sources	of	energy.	Other	groups,	
in	turn,	raise	issues	that	have	been	neglected	(or	acknowledged	to	a	very	limited	extent)	by	
the	remaining	parties,	such	as	the	problems	of	the	elderly	and	access	to	telecommunications	
services.	Thus,	the	Pirate	Party	is	recruiting	its	supporters	by	dealing	with	the	issue	of	fre-
edom	of	expression	on	the	Internet18.	A	sign	of	the	dissatisfaction	of	German	voters	with	the	
activity	of	the	main	political	actors	is	their	support	for	radical	movements.	Anti-immigrant	
sentiments	enjoy	relatively	high	support	in	Germany19,	as	evidenced	by	an	enduring	public	
debate	on	a	controversial	book	by	an	SPD	politician,	Thilo	Sarrazin,	who	referred	to	the	
intellectual	potential	and	diligence	of	fore-
igners	in	an	offensive	manner.	Hence	the	
support	for	right-wing	and	anti-immigrant	
PRO	 groups	 (such	 as	 Pro	 Deutschland,	
Pro	NRW,	Pro	Köln)	which	 focus	on	op-
posing	the	“Islamisation”	of	Germany	and	
which	 organised	 the	 notorious	 protests	
against	 the	 construction	 of	 a	 mosque	
in	Cologne	in	2007-2008.	Leftist	ideolo-
gies	 are	 also	 gaining	 supporters,	 as	 evi-
denced	by	the	stable	position	of	the	Left	
Party20	which	is	comprised	of	many	different	groups,	including	the	extreme	left-wing	gro-
ups	which	are	 seen	as	 anti-system	parties	 and	 remain	under	 surveillance	by	 the	Office	
for	 Protection	 of	 the	Constitution,	 both	 on	 the	 federal	 state	 and	 national	 level.	 Another	
expression	of	left-wing	sentiments	are	May	Day	and	anti-globalisation	demonstrations,	brin-
ging	together	thousands	of	participants.	The	popularity	of	 left-wing	views	partly	explains	
the	declining	support	for	the	liberal	FDP,	which	is	the	only	small	party	not	to	benefit	from	
the	weakness	of	the	catch-all	parties.	In	the	case	of	the	FDP,	however,	the	main	reasons	are	
the	problems	of	the	federal	coalition	(which	the	FDP	co-forms)	and	personal	disputes.
The crisis of the large parties and the 
emergence of new social expectations 
have brought about the fragmentation 
of German political scene. 
The parties that are gaining importance 
are either the newly emerging ones or 
the existing ones that had not played 
a significant role in German politics.
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21	 In	Baden-Württemberg,	
Bremen,	Hamburg,	Saarland,	
Rhineland-Palatinate	and	
North	Rhine-Westphalia.
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
22	Before	the	exacerbation	
of	the	situation	in	Stuttgart,	
the	Greens	were	even	named	
as	a	potential	coalition	partner	
of	the	CDU	in	Baden-	
-Württemberg.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
23	One	of	the	chairs	of	the	party	
is	Cem	Özdemir,	a	politician	
of	Turkish	origin.
The Greens as the main beneficiary of social changes
The	Greens	are	 the	party	which	has	benefitted	most	 from	both	social	 changes	and	 the	
problems	of	large	parties.	It	owes	its	extraordinarily	high	popularity	mostly	to	the	negati-
ve	attitude	Germans	have	to	nuclear	energy,	its	consistent	pacifist	rhetoric	and	finally	its	
‘freshness’	after	being	in	opposition	for	six	years.	However,	its	popularity	may	be	temporary.	
Once	 the	Bundestag	adopts	 the	energy	strategy	which	envisages	 the	closure	of	German	
nuclear	power	plants	by	2022	(the	vote	is	scheduled	for	June	30,	2011),	the	Greens	will	
lose	a	key	element	of	their	founding	myth	(i.e.	opposition	to	the	use	of	nuclear	energy)	and	
an	important	factor	of	social	support.	To	maintain	this	high	level	of	support,	the	party	would	
have	to	overhaul	its	political	agenda.
The	Greens	have	existed	on	 the	German	
political	 scene	 since	 the	 1980s.	 At	 the	
moment,	 they	are	members	of	ruling	co-
alitions	 in	 6	 out	 of	 16	 federal	 state	 go-
vernments21,	and	in	1998-2005	they	co-
formed	the	national-level	government	with	
the	SPD.	Yet	until	recently,	they	were	per-
ceived	chiefly	as	a	party	of	environmenta-
lists	 and	 pacifists	 whose	 entire	 program	
boiled	down	to	the	opposition	to	nuclear	
energy	and	the	defence	of	minority	rights.	
The	Greens	were	considered	a	protest	party,	which	contested	the	traditional	ways	of	doing	
politics,	yet	was	unable	to	offer	a	feasible	alternative.	The	party	itself	and	its	perception	
have	begun	 to	 change	 since	 it	 formed	 a	 national-level	 coalition	with	 the	SPD	 in	1998.	
The	need	to	make	compromise	decisions	–	such	as	the	Bundeswehr’s	participation	in	the	
NATO	air	strikes	in	Kosovo	in	1999	and	the	gradual	closing	of	nuclear	power	plants	in	2002	
–	forced	the	Greens	to	ease	their	strict	programme.	Gradually	they	became	a	party	that	was	
attractive	not	only	to	left-wing	voters,	but	also	to	the	wider	electorate.	Along	with	the	social	
changes	and	decreasing	interest	 in	the	catch-all	parties,	the	evolution	of	the	Greens	has	
contributed	to	their	increasing	attractiveness	as	a	potential	coalition	partner	for	Germany’s	
biggest	parties22.
The	unprecedented	rise	in	the	popularity	of	the	Greens,	noted	since	mid-2010,	proves	that	
the	party	has	successfully	adapted	to	the	transformation	of	German	society.	The	Greens	
owe	this	rise	in	support	not	so	much	to	their	milder	rhetoric	or	a	new	political	program,	
as	to	their	excellent	intuition	concerning	public	sentiment	and	a	sense	of	timing.	The	afore-
mentioned	protests	against	the	extension	of	the	railway	station	in	Stuttgart	in	the	summer	
of	2010	(where	environmental	issues	played	a	significant	role)	marked	the	increase	in	the	
party’s	poll	showings.	This	 favourable	 trend	was	 reinforced	by	public	concern	about	 the	
nuclear	power	plant	accident	in	Japan	and	the	widespread	opposition	to	the	further	use	of	
nuclear	energy	in	Germany.	In	the	issue	of	climate	protection	the	Greens	are	considered	to	
be	a	genuine	and	consistent	party	and	enjoy	great	public	confidence.
Also	crucial	in	the	growing	popularity	of	the	Greens	is	the	specific	structure	of	the	party,	
which	differs	 from	the	 traditional	structure	of	German	parties:	 it	has	 two	chairs,	gender	
parity,	 it	 is	 open	 to	 young	 people	 and	 persons	 of	 immigrant	 origin23.	 Another	 asset	 of	
the	Greens	is	their	‘freshness’	–	despite	thirty	years	of	existence,	the	party	has	not	been	
the	main	coalition	partner	in	any	of	the	federal	state	governments,	and	is	therefore	linked	
The unprecedented rise in the popu-
larity of the Greens proves that the 
party has successfully adapted to 
the transformation of German society. 
The Greens owe this rise in support 
not so much to their milder rhetoric 
or a new political program, as to their 
intuition and a sense of timing.
i s s u e  5 5  |  2 7 . 0 6 . 2 0 1 1  |  c e N T R e  f O R  e A s T e R N  s T u d i e s
cOMMeNTARyOsw
OSW.WAW.PL 7
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
24	As	happened	in	the	case	of	
the	energy	strategy	adopted	
by	the	federal	German	govern-
ment	in	the	autumn	of	2010	
–	it	was	not	put	to	a	vote	in	
the	Bundesrat	as	the	coalition	
of	the	CDU,	CSU	and	FDP	had	
no	majority	in	that	body.
25	One	example	of	this	was	the	
decision	to	put	a	hold	on	
nuclear	energy	before	the	
elections	in	Baden-Württem-
berg	and	Rhineland-Palatinate	
and	the	postponement	of	the	
decision	concerning	the	aid	
pact	for	Greece	before	the	
elections	in	North	Rhine-	
-Westphalia	in	2010.
to	 the	hope	of	 initiating	a	 significant	 change	 in	 the	policy	 of	 ruling	 coalitions.	Six	 years	
of	opposition	activity	since	the	end	of	 the	coalition	of	 the	SPD	and	the	Greens	 in	Berlin	
have	reinforced	the	party’s	image	as	a	fresh,	uncompromising	force	laden	with	new	ideas.	
However,	 such	 a	 rapid	 growth	 in	 popularity	 carries	 the	 risk	 of	 an	 equally	 rapid	 loss	 of	
support	if	the	election	promises	are	not	kept.	This	was	the	case	with	the	FDP,	which	won	
a	record-high	support	(14.6%)	in	the	elections	to	the	Bundestag	in	2009,	due	to	its	pre-
vious	activity	as	 the	parliamentary	opposition	and	due	to	 the	expectations	 that	 the	FDP	
had	excellent	economic	expertise.	At	the	moment,	the	FDP	has	as	little	as	5%	of	the	vote.	
The	decision	by	the	federal	government	to	close	all	German	nuclear	power	plants	by	2022	
may	cause	a	serious	crisis	 for	the	Greens,	who	would	 lose	one	of	 their	crucial	demands	
which	has	been	so	appealing	to	voters	from	all	social	groups.
Conclusions
1.	The	German	political	scene	will	still	be	dominated	by	the	two	largest	parties;	however,	
their	supremacy	will	be	eroding.	The	catch-all	parties,	each	of	whom	has	so	far	gained	
more	than	30%	of	votes	in	the	elections,	may	have	difficulties	obtaining	the	same	result	
in	future	and	will	face	the	need	to	form	a	coalition	made	up	of	three	or	more	parties.	
It	will	reinforce	the	process	of	convergence	among	the	parties,	but	on	the	other	hand	it	
will	make	it	more	difficult	to	reach	a	common	position	on	controversial	issues	that	might	
displease	the	core	electorate	of	a	given	party.
2.	The	German	party	landscape	is	likely	to	become	more	diverse,	and	small	parties	may	
surprisingly	become	equal	partners	to	the	catch-all	parties,	as	is	already	the	case	with	
the	Greens.	New	 local	 initiatives	will	have	an	 increasing	 impact	on	 the	national-level	
policy.	By	using	the	issues	which	currently	draw	the	attention	of	the	general	public,	the	
small	parties	have	the	chance	to	seriously	weaken	the	position	of	the	large	parties	or	to	
influence	their	decisions.
3.	The	most	likely	scenario	is	the	strengthening	of	the	position	of	the	Bundesrat	–	the	repre-
sentation	of	the	federal	states	in	Berlin	–	which	has	a	say	in	legislative	issues	concerning	
the	federal	states	(including	financial	issues).	In	a	situation	where	the	political	composi-
tion	of	the	Bundesrat	is	different	than	that	of	the	national	coalition,	the	decision-making	
process	may	be	significantly	prolonged,	and	projects	proposed	by	the	government	may	
even	 be	 blocked.	 Therefore,	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 keeping	 the	 federal	 state	 governments,	
the	decisions	made	on	the	national	level	may	pass	over	the	Bundesrat24	and	controver-
sial	reforms	may	be	postponed	until	after	the	elections25.	
4.	German	domestic	politics	have	an	increasing	impact	on	the	country’s	foreign	and	secu-
rity	policy.	Calculations	ahead	of	the	federal	state	elections	affect	Germany’s	decisions	
taken	at	the	level	of	the	European	Union	and	other	international	organisations.	An	ex-
ample	of	this	is	Foreign	Affairs	Minister	Guido	Westerwelle’s	decision	to	abstain	during	
the	vote	on	Resolution	1973	of	the	UN	Security	Council	on	Libya.	Another	illustration	
of	 this	 trend	 is	 Germany’s	 tentative	 attitude	 towards	 the	 euro	 zone	 rescue	 strategy.	
Showing	the	lack	of	a	clearly	defined	stance,	Germany	is	becoming	a	less	predictable	
partner	for	its	allies.	This	trend	will	be	reinforced	by	the	fact	that	the	importance	of	the	
Bundesrat	is	likely	to	grow,	and	the	decisions	within	national-level	coalitions	will	have	to	
be	reached	by	a	greater	number	of	parties	than	ever	before.	This	will	make	Germany’s	
international	decisions	even	more	dependent	on	the	domestic	political	situation.
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The results of the Bundestag elections
1983 1994 2009
CDU/CSU 48.79% 41.43% 33.80%
SPD 38.18% 36.39% 23.03%
FDP 6.95% 6.92% 14.56%
The Greens 5.57% 7.27% 10.71%
The Left Party 
(PDS in 1994)
- 4.39% 11.89%
The number of party members represented in Bundestag; data for 2010
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